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A Behavioral Economic Approach to
Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy
ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament advocates have provided a strong
moral voice for the total disarmamentof nuclear weapons, but if
they are to remain credible participants in the disarmament
process, they must redouble their efforts to assist in the difficult
technical and political obstacles that stand in the way of a
world without nuclear weapons. This Note first outlines
impediments to disarmament towards which advocates could
helpfully direct their attention, such as: conventional force
imbalances; developing "proliferation-safe" civil nuclear
technologies; enforcing nonproliferation obligations; and
verifying nuclear disarmament. Second, it explains how tools
from behavioral economics and negotiation theory could inform
a more influential disarmament advocacy. Among other things,
it suggests an iterative approach to disarmament to combat loss
aversion and reference dependence. To fight time discounting,
this Note urges support for ex ante agreement on UN Security
Council action in response to violations of the nonproliferation
regime. Finally, it recommends using a fairness norm based on
process rather than distribution in formal disarmament
negotiations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today there is increasing agreement, especially among leaders of
the West, that nuclear disarmament must be a political priority, and
nongovernmental disarmament advocates can claim some credit for
this state of affairs. However, if these advocates are to remain
relevant, they must move beyond their traditional moral arguments
for the abolition of nuclear weapons toward an advocacy that helps
states solve the real and difficult problems that stand in the way of a
world free of these weapons of mass destruction. The will to pursue
disarmament is stronger than ever, but the way remains challenging.
President Barack Obama declared in a 2009 Prague speech that
the United States is committed "to seek the peace and security of a
world without nuclear weapons." ' When the Nobel Committee
awarded President Obama the Nobel Prize, it stated that special
attention was given to the President's commitment to a world without
nuclear weapons. 2 Before the President gave his Prague speech,
George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn in
2007 wrote an opinion piece arguing for a nuclear-weapon-free world,
and listed a series of steps that could be taken toward that end. 3 In
2008, UK Defense Minister Des Browne told the Conference on
Disarmament that his country was dedicated to a world free of
nuclear weapons and introduced a new process to study the difficult
challenge of disarmament verification.4 President Nicolas Sarkozy of
France delivered a speech in 2008 that was more ambivalent on
complete nuclear disarmament than the speeches by the leaders of
the United Kingdom and the United States, but which nonetheless
was remarkable in that a French President was willing to address the
topic at all in such detail.5

1.
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by President Barack
Obama, Prague (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.
2.
Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize 2009 (Oct.
9, 2009), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peacellaureates/2009/
press.html.
3.
See George P. Shultz et al., Opinion, A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html.
Des Browne, U.K. Sec'y of State for Defense, Speech at the Conference on
4.
Nuclear Disarmament (Feb. 5, 2008), transcriptavailable at http://www.labour.org.uk/
des browne conference on nuclear disarmament.
See Nicolas Sarkozy, President of Fr., Presentation of Le Terrible in
5.
Cherbourg (Mar. 21, 2008), transcript available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
2008/03/24/presentation%2Dofo2Dle%2Dterrible%2Din%2Dcherbourglynb (urging all
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A community of nongovernmental advocates (NGAs), composed
of private individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
focused particularly on nuclear disarmament advocacy, deserves
some credit for elevating the issue of nuclear disarmament to such
heights. Ever since the end of World War II, there have been
influential members of civil society giving a voice to common citizens
and advocating for the abolition of nuclear weapons. With the entry
into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) in 1970 and the accompanying periodic cycle of international
meetings to review its operation, these advocates were presented a
more formal venue within which to conduct their disarmament
advocacy. In recent years, NGAs have increased their presence in the
NPT review process and kept the fire to the feet of world leaders.
They carried a simple message: the average citizen of the world does
not want nuclear weapons to exist. The fact that world leaders such
as President Obama have recently given prominent speeches on
nuclear disarmament suggests that the message has been received.
Today, however, is a dangerous time for nongovernmental
disarmament advocacy. The moral arguments for nuclear
disarmament have been made and understood. There is diminishing
doubt around the world that complete nuclear disarmament should be
pursued. The question now is how. These advocates today risk their
relevance if they do not evolve along with the changing nuclear
disarmament landscape. They must turn their attention to helping
states solve the most difficult challenges standing in the way of
further nuclear reductions and eventual total disarmament. It is no
longer enough to tell states what they should do in broad strokes to
achieve nuclear disarmament; now is the time for diligence, to delve
into the minute details that states are forced to confront when
implementing their disarmament visions. The summit has been
identified, now is the time to help states prepare an expedition.
This Note is organized into five parts. After this introduction,
Part II provides a summary of the NPT, focusing on its disarmament
provision, and recounts the development of NGA involvement in the
NPT review process. Part III describes some of the difficult obstacles
that states must overcome to make significant progress toward
nuclear disarmament, and on which disarmament advocates might
helpfully involve themselves. These obstacles include: the impact of
disarmament on perceptions of security and political influence in
nuclear-weapon states, nuclear-related security concerns in nonnuclear-weapon states, and the verification of nuclear disarmament.
Part IV outlines an approach based on behavioral economics that
advocates could employ to help states solve these problems and take

countries with nuclear weapons to dismantle their
announcing some nuclear reductions).

nuclear-testing

sites, and
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significant steps toward nuclear disarmament. This approach
suggests reframing the issue and developing specific advocacy
strategies for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
Part V summarizes the results and offers a conclusion.
II. THE TREATY ON

THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS AND PRIVATE ADVOCACY

The NPT, which was opened for signature in 1968 and entered
into force in 1970, has the titular purpose of curbing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. 6 The NPT has been ratified by 190 states,
making it the most adhered-to arms-control treaty in history. 7 It
recognizes five nuclear-weapon states, China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, and classifies all other
states as non-nuclear-weapon states for the purposes of the treaty.8
Only four states are not party to the NPT: India, Israel, and
Pakistan, which never adhered to it, and North Korea, which most
states recognize as having withdrawn in 2003.9
The precise hierarchy of NPT obligations is often debated, but it
is safe to say that three of the treaty's primary purposes are (1) to
curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) to declare that the
responsible use of nuclear energy is permitted, and (3) to commit to a
goal of nuclear disarmament.' 0 The nonproliferation obligations of the
NPT are specified in Articles I and II and require that weapon states
shall not transfer or provide any assistance in the development of
nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear-weapon state, and non-nuclearweapon states shall not receive any such weapons or seek
development assistance." Next, Article III requires that all parties
accept appropriate safeguards negotiated with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the fulfillment of obligations
under the treaty. 12 Article IV affirms that all parties have an

6.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]; Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNODA, http://www.un.org/disarmament/
WMDINuclear/NPTtext.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
7.
Id.
8.
See NPT, supra note 6, art. IX (defining a nuclear-weapon state to be a
state "which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967").
9.

See, e.g., NPT Membership, JAMES MARTIN CENTER NONPROLIFERATION

STUD. (last updated June 5, 2012), http://cns.miis.edulinventory/pdfs/apmnpt.pdf
(listing the states party to the NPT and explaining North Korea's withdrawal).
10.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNITED
NATIONS

OFF. DISARMAMENT

AFF.,

http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/

NPT.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
NPT, supra note 6, arts. I, II.
11.
12.
Id. art. III.1.

2013/

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENTADVOCACY

973

"inalienable right" to peaceful nuclear energy, in conformity with the
nonproliferation obligations of the treaty. 13 Article VI is the
disarmament provision, which reads: "Each of the Parties to the
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control." 14
There has been a lot of debate about what Article VI actually
requires of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.
The plain language suggests that only good-faith negotiations are
required, but some, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
have argued that the NPT requires actual nuclear disarmament or at
least tangible steps in that direction.' 5 Though some disarmament
advocates promote the ICJ's advisory opinion as the definitive word
on what Article VI requires of parties, the ICJ's opinion that the NPT
requires actual nuclear disarmament is increasingly seen as
conclusory and stretching the plain meaning of the treaty.16 The
center of the debate today is focused on what "good faith" actually
requires, recognizing that actual nuclear disarmament probably
stretches the meaning of the NPT too far.
Every five years since 1975, parties to the NPT have convened to
"review the operation of [the] Treaty with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realized."' 7 Since 1995, private disarmament advocates and NGOs
have spoken with an increasingly forceful voice at these conferences.
Review conferences typically last four weeks and involve debate on
what can be done to promote the NPT's purposes for nonproliferation,
peaceful nuclear energy, disarmament, and other issues, such as how
to respond to withdrawals. The outcomes of review conferences have
ranged from acrimony and disagreement to consensus final

13.
Id. art. IV.
14.
Id. art. VI.
15.
Compare Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 267 (July 8) (concluding that the NPT requires states to
"pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament"), and DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY 103-04 (2011) (arguing that Article VI should be interpreted to
mean there is an obligation on all parties to "proactively, diligently, sincerely, and
consistently pursue meaningful negotiations on effective measures relating to the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons"), with Christopher A. Ford, Debating
Disarmament, 14 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 401, 405-07 (2007) (arguing that the
negotiating history of the NPT reveals that Article VI does not require states to achieve
anything, but only pursue negotiations in good faith).
16.
JOYNER, supra note 15, at 96-97.
17.
NPT, supra note 6, art. VIII.3. It is important to note that other than a
meeting five years after entry into force and another at twenty-five years after entry
into force, no other conferences are required by the Treaty. Id. arts. VIII.3, X.2.

974

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:969

documents recommending that various practical steps be taken to
advance the goals of the NPT.18 Because the focus of this Note is NGA
disarmament advocacy, it briefly summarizes the participation of
such advocates in the disarmament debate of recent review
conferences.
In 1995, states party convened as required by Article X of the
NPT and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely.' 9 Contrary to this
decision, most NGAs seem to have favored a long-term, but bounded,
extension of the NPT, such as by twenty-five years, so as to retain
leverage over nuclear-weapon states. 20 The thinking was that if
nuclear-weapon states wanted the NPT extended again, they might
have to pay a price in terms of some significant new commitment on
disarmament. 21 Though these advocates did not see their preferences
realized regarding extension of the treaty, the conference did mark
the beginning of the NGA disarmament advocacy strategy that seems
to have endured until today. 22 NGA disarmament advocacy began to
focus intently on what would come to be called a nuclear-weapons
convention, namely a treaty that requires complete nuclear
disarmament within a specified timeframe. 2 3
At the 2000 review conference, NGAs continued to argue a moral
imperative for nuclear disarmament and bolstered their efforts to
build support for a nuclear-weapons convention. For example, the
mayor of Nagasaki passionately recounted the horrors suffered by
Japanese victims of the World War II nuclear strikes, warned of the
dangers of human annihilation, and argued for a nuclear-weapons
convention. 24 Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, disarmament advocate and

See, e.g., Lewis A. Dunn, The NPT: Assessing the Past,Building the Future,
18.
16 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 143, 160-61, 164-65, 167-69 (2009) (discussing a range of
past review conference outcomes).
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
19.
Nuclear Weapons, New York, U.S., Apr. 17-May 12, 1995, Extension of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I),
Annex (May 12, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/
1995-NPT/pdflNPTCONF199503.pdf.
20.
See John Burroughs & Jacqueline Cabasso, Confronting the Nuclear-Armed
States in InternationalNegotiating Forums: Lessons for NGOs, 4 INT'L NEGOT. 457, 467
(1999) (explaining how the indefinite extension was the result of skillful diplomatic
maneuvering of the conference president and likely did not represent the desires of
some NGOs).
21.
See id. at 468 ("[E]xtension of the regime for relatively long periods of
time .. . could have . .. provided an ongoing stimulus for reduction and elimination of
nuclear arsenals.").
See id. (arguing that the 1995 conference marked a "significant
22.
development among the abolitionist NGOs with respect to future strategy").
See id. (discussing how NGOs collaborated on a statement calling for
23.
"negotiations on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time bound
framework").
24.
Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki, Japan, Opening Address at the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference 2000 (May 3, 2000), transcript available at
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disseminator of the Pentagon Papers, also argued that a meaningful
commitment to the NPT's disarmament provision would only be
demonstrated if the nuclear-weapon states first and foremost
immediately began multilateral negotiations leading to complete
nuclear disarmament.2 5 Notably, the 2000 review conference also
produced the famous "13 Steps" toward nuclear disarmament, which
included an agreement to achieve the entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, an agreement to begin
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and various other
commitments on verification, transparency, and diminishment of the
roles for nuclear weapons in states' defense strategies. 26
In contrast to the 2000 review conference, NGAs almost
universally viewed the 2005 NPT review conference as a terrible
failure. Most blamed the United States, arguing among other things
that the United States would not accept any promotion of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, that it refused to build upon
or even recognize the 13 Steps agreed to in 2000, and that it simply
saw no value in multilateral diplomacy. 27 Many also recognized,
however, that Iran, Egypt, and the Non-Aligned Movement frustrated
negotiations by staking out extreme positions and failing to provide
constructive leadership. 28 NGAs continued in 2005 to promote a
nuclear-weapons convention within a specified time frame and urge the
moral imperative for disarmament. The primary development in terms
of disarmament advocacy was the view by some NGAs that the 13
Steps agreed to at the 2000 review conference were so tightly connected
to the core meaning of Article VI that they constituted legal
requirements for compliance under the NPT. 29
The most recent review conference in 2010 saw perhaps the most
strident advocacy yet for a nuclear-weapons convention. Indeed,
nearly every NGA presentation to the conference had as its principal
focus the need to begin negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention,

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2000/
NGOpres2000/2.pdf.
25.
Daniel Ellsberg, Presentation at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference 2000: Nuclear Disarmament (May 3, 2000), available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-foranpt/revcon2000/
NGOpres2000/5.pdf.
26.
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, U.S., Apr. 24-May 19, 2000, Final
Document, at 14-15, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I, II) (2000).
27.
Eg., Rebecca Johnson, Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review
Conference Failed, 80 DISARMAMENT DIPL. (2005).
28.
See id. (discussing "a dismal lack of leadership and the entrenched
positions and proliferation-promoting policies of a small number of influential states").
29.
John Burroughs et al., NGO Presentations to the 2005 NPT Review
CRITICAL WILL 8 (2005),
Conference: Compliance Assessment, REACHING
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/
revcon2005/NGOpres/compliance4.pdf.
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or otherwise advocated for such a convention. 3 0 For example, the
headline presentation by Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams
was titled "A Nuclear Weapons Convention: The True Path to
Nuclear Non-Proliferation," though in her presentation she
acknowledged that negotiations on such a convention could be long
and the actual disarmament process lengthy. 3 1
The preceding summary of NGA participation in the NPT review
process is of course simplistic. NGAs do not focus exclusively on
disarmament; they provide ideas on how to address nonproliferation
challenges, safely provide for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and
handle other timely issues like withdrawal from the NPT.3 2 However,
it is safe to say that the vast majority of NGA engagement at review
conferences has been directed toward disarmament-related issues.
Furthermore, the nature of this engagement on nuclear disarmament
has been largely normative, suggesting what nuclear-weapon states
should do. Even the 13 Steps agreed to at the 2000 review conference,
which are called practical steps, largely are normative in nature. For
example, it is urgent that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty be brought into force; it is necessary to begin negotiations on a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; and steps toward greater
transparency, diminishing reliance, and reduction of operation status
must be taken.3 3
There is nothing wrong with urging these disarmament
measures or any others, but there has been very little discussion
about how these "practical steps" should be accomplished in practice.
There are difficult political and often technical challenges that must
be overcome to take serious steps toward disarmament. Nuclear
disarmament cannot be achieved by will alone. It is time for the NGO
community to start helping NPT parties help themselves. In the next
Part, this Note outlines some of the challenges toward which
disarmament advocates may helpfully direct their attention.
Subsequently, this Note discusses how behavioral economics could
inform disarmament advocacy and bolster the influence of the NGA
community.

30.

See generally Statements to the 2010 NPT Review Conference: NGO

Statements,

REACHING

CRITICAL

WILL

1

(May

3,

2010),

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2010/statements#NGO
[hereinafter NGO Statements] (documenting the statements of various NGO leaders).
31.
Jody Williams, Chair, Nobel Women's Initiative, Statement at the Review
Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Nuclear Weapons Convention:
The True Path to Nuclear Non-Proliferation (May 7, 2010), transcript available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents[Disarmament-foralnpt/
revcon20lO/ngostatements/JodyWilliams.pdf.
32.

See, e.g., REBECCA JOHNSON, IS THE NPT UP TO THE CHALLENGE OF

PROLIFERATION?, available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2l86.pdf.
FinalDocument, supra note 26.
33.
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III. BEYOND MORAL ARGUMENTS: PRACTICAL
IMPEDIMENTS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Since before the entry into force of the NPT, NGAs have made
strong moral arguments for the abolition of nuclear weapons, but
these advocates have given less serious thought to the role they can
play in overcoming the difficult political and technological challenges
inhibiting progress toward nuclear disarmament. There are many
obstacles standing between the world as we know it and a world free
of nuclear weapons, a good summary of which has been provided by
George Perkovich and James Acton in their Abolishing Nuclear
Weapons Adelphi Paper.34 This Note divides what are perhaps the
most difficult problems associated with nuclear disarmament into
three broad categories.
First, the world must account for the near-term security concerns
of those states that possess nuclear weapons. This includes China and
Russia's concern about the conventional force superiority3 5 of the
United States, and the regional security problems that are at the
heart of the non-NPT nuclear-weapon state problem. Fair or not,
nuclear-weapon states are extraordinarily unlikely to relinquish
nuclear weapons if they perceive their own security or the security of
their allies will diminish. Second, the world must address the nuclear
security concerns related to non-nuclear-weapon states. These
include: the regulation of nuclear fuel and enrichment and
reprocessing technologies in a world increasingly interested in civil
uses of nuclear energy; the related development of effective
safeguards and enforcement mechanisms; and the impact of
disarmament on regional security alliances based on extended
nuclear assurances. Finally, and perhaps most challenging, the world
must start thinking about how to monitor and enforce nuclear
disarmament as countries reduce nuclear arsenals to small numbers
and eventually to zero. Even if the leader of-a nuclear-weapon state
wanted to disarm unilaterally, it would be politically infeasible to do
so without the satisfactory resolution of these issues.

34.

George Perkovich & James M. Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi

Paper 396, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE 30-46 (George Perkovich &

James M. Acton eds., 2009).
35.
I essentially use conventional to mean non-nuclear military capabilities.
The conventional force imbalance that concerns China and Russia includes missile
defense and space-based military capabilities. See Cristina Hansell & Nikita Perfilyev,
Together Toward Nuclear Zero: Understanding Chinese and Russian Security
Concerns, 16

NONPROLIFERATION

REV.

435,

436

(2009)

(arguing

that

nuclear

disarmament in China and Russia will depend on the perceived threat of a range of
U.S. conventional capabilities, including missile defense and space militarization).
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A. Security Concerns Related to Nuclear-Weapon States
There are many complicated factors that influence a state's
decision to develop nuclear weapons, but broadly speaking, today
there essentially are two kinds of nuclear-weapon states: worldpolitical actors and issue-specific possessors, namely, the five NPT
nuclear-weapon states and those states possessing nuclear weapons
that are outside the treaty. This Note puts those five states in the
category of world-political actors, but in reality, China, Russia, and
the United States are the indispensible NPT states for nuclear
disarmament. 36 In the context of the NPT review process, it is natural
that most states party focus on the disarmament of NPT nuclearweapon states. 37 The perceived effects of nuclear disarmament on
these states' global political influence significantly influence their
disarmament calculus. But advocates of nuclear disarmament must
also appreciate the need to address the challenges posed by non-NPT
nuclear-weapon states, recognizing that disarmament for these states
largely is viewed through the lens of region-specific security issues.
The obstacles to disarmament posed by these two kinds of states are
somewhat different and are addressed in turn.
Table 1
Categories of Nuclear-Weapon States
NPT Nuclear-Weapon States
Non-NPT Nuclear-Weapon States
(World-Political Actors)
(Issue-Specific Possessors)
China
India
Israel 38
France
Russia
Pakistan
United Kingdom
North Korea (withdrew from the NPT)
United States
Arguably the primary disarmament-related security concern for
NPT nuclear-weapon states involves the conventional force imbalance
between the United States on the one hand, and China and Russia,
on the other. Indeed, if all states were to completely destroy their
nuclear arsenals tomorrow, arguably no state would strategically

36.
See id. at 435-36 ("[The United States, Russia, and China are in the best
position to impact global nuclear weapons norms . . . . [T]he choices made in these
three countries will determine if the world is able to start down the path toward
complete nuclear disarmament.").
37.
A clear exception to this majority focus is the near exclusive attention paid
to Israel by many states in the Middle East and North Africa. Interestingly, few states
pay significant attention to the problems for disarmament posed by India, Pakistan,
and North Korea.
38.
Israel has not admitted to developing nuclear weapons but is widely
assumed to possess them.
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benefit more than the United States due to its dominant conventional
capabilities. 39 Conversely, China and Russia would find their
military deterrence and power-projection capabilities relatively
diminished. 40
The United States, China, Russia, and arguably the NPT itself
acknowledge that nuclear disarmament is inherently linked to
conventional military capabilities. For example, the United States in
its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recognized that its security
perceptions allowed further nuclear reductions in part because of its
unrivaled conventional military capabilities. 41 China, in multiple
official working papers and statements at NPT meetings, has
indicated that it does not intend to take any steps toward nuclear
disarmament, nor even make any nuclear reductions, until reductions
from the United States result in near parity with China's nuclear
capabilities.4 2 Perkovich and Acton note that private discussions with
the People's Liberation Army and China's nuclear-weapons
establishment revealed that Beijing is doubtful Russian and U.S.
nuclear disarmament is likely to happen in a way that would
alleviate China's security concerns such that it would feel safe
without a small nuclear deterrent. 43 Russia has indicated that there
is a limit to how far it is willing to reduce its nuclear arsenal while
the United States maintains conventional force superiority. 44
Finally, the fact that Article VI references the nuclear-arms race,
nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament
indicates some connection between nuclear disarmament and general,

39.
See Ford, supra note 15, at 405 (quoting U.S. officials as stating that the
United States would benefit strategically from total disarmament).
40.
See Hansell & Nikita, supra note 35, at 455 (discussing the interrelated
power politics between the United States, Russia, and China based on their relative
nuclear programs).
41.
DEPT. OF DEFENSE, 2010 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 6 (2010),
available at http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%
20report.pdf.
42.
See, e.g., 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, U.S., May 3-28, 2010, Working Paper
Submitted by China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear
War, 1 7, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/WP.63 (May 6, 2010) (stating that the United
States and Russia must "take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear
arsenals . . . so as to create necessary conditions for ...

nuclear disarmament.").

43.
Perkovich & Acton, supra note 34, at 28.
44.
See, e.g., Delegation of the Russian Fed'n, Statement at Main Committee I
of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons 5 (May 7, 2010), available at http://www.reachingeriticalwill.org/
images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/statements/7MayRussia.pdf
("[W]e are building on the assumption that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be
discussed only as an ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in the
circumstances of strengthening strategic stability and strictly complying with the
principle of equal security for all.").
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i.e. conventional, disarmament. 45 There has been some debate among
NPT scholars as to what extent the three undertakings specified in
Article VI were intended to be sequential or conditional upon each
other. 46 Article VI alone suggests some connection between nuclear
disarmament and conventional weapons, but the preamble is
instructive as well:
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the
strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the
cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all
their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control . . .47

The references in this preambular language to "international tension"
and nuclear disarmament "pursuant to a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament" further suggest that the negotiators of the
NPT understood there to be some connection between nuclear
disarmament and conventional weapons. 48
The exact connection between nuclear and general and complete
disarmament surely will continue to be debated, but whatever the
legal relationship between nuclear disarmament and conventional
weapons, the political reality is that China and Russia take the
connection seriously. 4 9 Further advocacy for nuclear disarmament
should take account of this political reality and help China, Russia,
and the United States think about how to address the insecurities
stemming from conventional force imbalance.
Issue-specific possessors, on the other hand, are less concerned
with global force projection and instead view their nuclear weapons
more as a deterrent against specific, regional, and existential threats.
Regardless of moral consensus and formal multilateral processes for
nuclear disarmament, these states are unlikely to take serious
disarmament measures unless their perceived regional security
threats are resolved.

See NPT, supra note 6, art. VI ("Each of the Parties to the Treaty
45.
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race . .. and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament. . . .").
46.
Compare JOYNER, supra note 15, at 102 (arguing that the three
undertakings "are separate obligations with no conditionality or sequencing legally
connecting them"), with Ford, supra note 15, at 404-05 (arguing that the Treaty does
not require nuclear disarmament before general and complete disarmament).
47.
NPT, supra note 6, pmbl.
48.
Ford, supra note 15, at 404-05.
49.
See Hansell & Nikita, supra note 35, at 455 (analyzing the interrelated
future plans of China and Russia based on possible U.S. steps taken toward either
nuclear or general disarmament).
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India arguably is the issue-specific state most similar to the NPT
nuclear-weapon states in that its program in part probably was
developed for political reasons, though it is maintained as a deterrent
against neighboring threats. The conventional wisdom is that India
originally developed a nuclear program in response to China, and
today also views its program as a deterrent against Pakistan. 50
Perkovich, however, argues that the security threat from China in the
early 1960s was only vaguely defined, and the fact that it refused to
deploy nuclear weapons for the following thirty years suggests that
its nuclear program was not exclusively a result of security
concerns. 51 Instead, he argues that India developed nuclear
capabilities at least as much out of a desire to be seen as a worldpolitical actor, and for the technological prestige that accompanies
this type of technology. 52 Today, India is perhaps the most vocal
advocate of nuclear disarmament among the nuclear-armed states,
but it still conditions its own disarmament on the disarmament of
China and Pakistan.5 3 India, like China and Russia vis-A-vis the
United States, would want to ensure that its conventional forces
would be sufficient to deter China. 54
Pakistan is a more paradigmatic example of an issue-specific
possessor, with its program intimately related to security concerns
regarding India. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto initiated a
nuclear program after the loss of East Pakistan to India in 1971.55 To
this day, Pakistan's nuclear program is directed almost entirely at
deterring aggression from India and is considered necessary because
of India's superior conventional military capability. 56 Indeed, though
Pakistan has pledged not to use nuclear weapons first against any
non-nuclear state, it has not ruled out a first strike against India.5 7
Without a political reconciliation between India and Pakistan, it is
difficult to see how South Asia could rid itself of nuclear weapons,
even if the NPT nuclear-weapon states were to disarm.
Israel has never confirmed that it has nuclear weapons, but it is
not difficult to understand why it would have developed them. Israel
reportedly began considering a nuclear-weapon program as early as

50.
GEORGE PERKOVICH, INDIA'S NUCLEAR BOMB 5-6 (1999).
51.
Id. at 6.
Id.
52.
53.
See generally, Perkovich & Acton, supra note 34, at 28-29 (providing a
discussion of India's long-term goals for disarmament).
54.
See id. (discussing India's desire that its traditional forces be able to deter
both China and Pakistan).
55.
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/nuke
/guide/pakistan/nuke/ (last updated Dec. 11, 2002).
56.
PAUL K. KERR & MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34248,
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY ISSUES 3 (2012),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.
57.
Id. at 12.
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1949.58 In the wake of World War II, the early director of the Israeli
Atomic Energy Commission, Ernst David Bergmann, advocated the
development of nuclear weapons to ensure "that [Israel] shall never
again be led as lambs to the slaughter."59 Since then, Israel has been
surrounded by states often hostile to its existence. Given the almost
constant state of tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the
history of regional wars, including the Six-Day War and the Yom
Kippur War, and Israel's small size, it is easy to understand the
appeal of nuclear weapons for Israeli decision makers. It also is
understandable how the more recent threats from Iran could serve to
bolster the conviction of Israel's elites that nuclear weapons are a
necessary deterrent against potentially existential threats. Without a
comprehensive peace between Israel and at least its Arab neighbors,
Israel's decision makers are likely to continue to see advantages to a
nuclear deterrent.
North Korea, as in many other things, is somewhat anomalous in
its nuclear calculus. Like other weapon states, there are rational
explanations for a nuclear deterrent that focus on a history of
regional security threats, in particular post-World War II, Cold War
dynamics and the Korean War, which still is not technically over and
is the source of the roughly 35,000 U.S. military personnel that
remain in South Korea. 60 However, North Korea more recently has
used its nuclear program as a bargaining tool in negotiations for
foreign aid to sustain its weak and isolated economy. 61 This
motivation creates complicated problems for working toward nuclear
disarmament: on the one hand, it facilitates negotiations on nuclear
disarmament, especially when North Korea's economy is in
particularly dire need and the United States and others are willing to
talk; on the other hand, there are strong disincentives for actual
disarmament, or even steps that cannot easily be undone. 62 Perhaps
one bit of encouraging news about North Korea is that today it is not
locked in the same kind of intractable regional security dilemma like

58.
See Nuclear Weapons: Israel, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/
nuke/guide/israellnuke/ (last updated Jan. 8, 2007) (recalling a 1949 geological survey
conducted by the Israel Defense Forces' Science Corps aimed at discovering uranium
reserves).
Id.
59.
60.
See MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34256, NORTH KOREA'S
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1 (2009) (tying North Korea's initial nuclear origination to Soviet
Union assistance and some of the country's more recent nuclear-weapons decisions,
particularly disarmament decisions, in response to South Korean actions); Victor Davis
Hanson, Why America Must Defend South Korea, RICOCHET (Nov. 25, 2010, 2:14 PM),
http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Why-America-Must-Defend-South-Korea.
61.
Linbo Jin, North Korea's Nuclear Paradox, BROOKINGS (May 27, 2009),
http://www.brookings.edulopinions/2009/0527north koreajin.aspx.
62.
See id. ("Since the [North Korean] economy needs a continuous flow of
foreign aid, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for [North Korea] to make a
final deal . .. as such a deal may shut off this aid.").

2013/

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ADVOCACY

983

India, Pakistan, and Israel, which alleviates some of the collective
action problems associated with nuclear disarmament in those cases.
However, it is hard to see how actual disarmament will occur on the
Korean Peninsula without significant political changes in Pyongyang
that guide a very different kind of economy and relationship with the
world.
It should be clear that serious advocates for nuclear
disarmament must not only think about the traditional great power
dynamics that originally produced nuclear weapons, but also about
the ongoing, regional conflicts that sustain interest in weapons
programs in non-NPT states. Even if the NPT process made serious
progress on steps toward nuclear disarmament, the possession of
nuclear weapons by some states outside the process would put a floor
on what practically was achievable: the NPT nuclear-weapon states
will not collectively disarm as long as other weapon states still exist.

B. Security Concerns Related to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
The disarmament-related security concerns related to nonnuclear-weapon states fall into two main categories: (1) how to ensure
access to civil nuclear technology without raising weapons
proliferation concerns, 63 and (2) how to safely manage military
alliances built on extended nuclear deterrence. 64 The first issue
largely affects developing countries, while the second largely affects
developed allies of the United States.
In the past decade, interest in nuclear energy has spiked among
developing nations. 65 A 2010 report from the IAEA attempts to
explain the reasons behind such sudden interest: "In the context of
growing energy demands to fuel economic growth and development,
climate change concerns, and volatile fossil fuel prices, as well as
improved safety and performance records, some 65 countries are
expressing interest in, considering, or actively planning for nuclear
power." 66 As the IAEA report suggests, there are good economic and
environmental reasons for why countries would wish to pursue
nuclear energy.6 7 There also, however, are proliferation concerns, and
these proliferation concerns only will become starker as current
nuclear-weapon states disarm.68 In 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei, the

63.
Perkovich & Acton, supra note 34, at 83-84.
64.
See James M. Acton, Extended Deterrence and Communicating Resolve, 8
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 5 (2009) (highlighting the effective communication of the United
States' resolve as the "key to extended nuclear deterrence").
65.
Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], InternationalStatus and Prospects of
Nuclear Power, at 10, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2010/12-GC(54)/INF/5 (Sept. 2, 2010).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
Pierre Goldschmidt, MultilateralNuclear Fuel Supply Guarantees & Spent
68.
Fuel Management: What Are the Priorities?,139 DAEDALUS 7, 8 (2010).
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Egyptian former Director General of the IAEA, argued that countries
that traditionally had produced the world's fuel for nuclear reactors
had strong accounting and protection measures in place, subjected
their facilities to regular inspection by the IAEA, and implemented
robust export controls, all in an attempt to control the spread of
sensitive dual-use nuclear technology-specifically, technology that
could be used for both civil and military purposes.6 9 However, he
noted that controlling access to this technology has become
increasingly difficult as the technological and economic hurdles to
developing it have eroded with time. 70 It is no longer the case that
only highly skilled, industrial, wealthy countries can develop nuclear
technology. 71 The ever-lower barrier to nuclear technology raises
nuclear-weapon proliferation concerns, because so much of the
technology is dual use.7 2
Surely some developing countries will have no ill intent, but
some may, and the very fact that the nuclear genie could be
unleashed in so many countries increases the chance that many
countries could become virtual nuclear-weapon countries.7 3 Virtual
nuclear-weapon capability means having the capacity to produce
nuclear weapons within a very short time frame, based on existing
fissile material stocks and technological capability. 74 Though perhaps
arguably better than many states actually possessing nuclear
weapons, a world of many virtual nuclear-weapon states could be
nearly as unstable.75
As a means to prevent such a virtual nuclear world while still
maintaining access to nuclear materials and technology for peaceful
purposes, the idea of multilateral fuel supply and waste mechanisms
has become increasingly popular in recent years.7 6 Such proposals
would place nuclear materials, as well as fuel production and waste
services, under the control of multilateral corporations or other
organizations.7 7 The system would address the concern of developing
countries that nuclear fuel could be cut off by a few supply countries
for political reasons, while assuring those concerned about weapons

69.
Mohamed ElBaradei, Towards a Safer World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2003,
http://www.economist.com/node/2137602.
70.
Id.
71.
Iran is a perfect example of how the traditional characteristics of a country
capable of developing nuclear technology no longer apply.
72.
ElBaradei, supra note 69.
73.
GEORGE PALOCZI-HORVATH, RESEARCH REPORT No. 3: VIRTUAL NUCLEAR
CAPABILITIES AND DETERRENCE IN A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 8 (1998).
74.
Id. at 3.
75.
See id. at 9 (asserting that if a country has virtual nuclear-weapon
capability, "all it might take to build a nuclear device is one year's effort or efforts of
two major industrial companies").
76.
Goldschmidt, supra note 68, at 7.
77.
See id. at 9 (providing an overview of "[m]ultilateral approaches to nuclear
fuel supply").
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proliferation that nuclear power in developing countries does not
have to pose proliferation risks.78
Not every country, however, will be willing to forego indigenous
development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, nor could
countries be required to do so under the NPT.79 Furthermore, some
developing countries like Iran already are pursuing advanced nuclear
technologies with serious weapons potential.8 0 For these reasons, in
addition to providing alternatives to indigenous nuclear-technology
development, the IAEA must have the tools to credibly monitor
nuclear activities inside countries, and by its own admission, it has
not kept up with the times.8 1
The IAEA has done a credible job of verifying states' declared
nuclear materials and facilities, but as was made blatantly clear in
the early 1990s in Iraq and more recently in Iran, it has done less
well in discovering and monitoring undeclared nuclear materials and
facilities.82 Many proposals have been made for exactly how the
IAEA's verification authorities should be strengthened, but perhaps
the most instructive view is that of the IAEA itself in what it believes
is required to adequately do its job.
Yukia Amano, the Director General of the IAEA has consistently
stated that in order for the IAEA to give credible assurances that
there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in a state,
Additional Protocols must be brought into force in every state.83
Additional Protocols to a state's standard safeguard agreement,
among other things, typically give the IAEA expanded authority: to
conduct inspections of all parts of a state's nuclear-fuel cycle, to
conduct short-notice inspections of all buildings at a nuclear site, and
to collect environmental samples beyond declared nuclear locations in
order to investigate the presence of any undeclared nuclear activity. 84
Such measures go well beyond the standard safeguard agreement,

78.

Id. at 7.

79.
NPT, supra note 6, art. IV.
80.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 10, IAEA
Doc. GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011).
81.
See Herman Nackaerts, Deputy Dir. Gen., IAEA, Keynote Address at the
INMM 52nd Annual Meeting: IAEA Safeguards Cooperation as the Key to Change 1-2
(July 18, 2011), transcript available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/
statements-repository/Key-to.Change.pdf (highlighting key ways in which the IAEA's
safeguard system can be more effective).
82.
Id. at 2-3.
83.
Yukia Amano, Dir. Gen., IAEA, Statement at the 2010 Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (May 3,
2010), transcript available at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdfl
headiaeaen.pdf.
84.
Factsheets: IAEA Safeguards Overview:, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/Englishsg-overview.html
(last visited
Feb. 21, 2013).
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which are focused on a state's declared nuclear materials and
facilities.85
Herman Nakaerts, the Deputy Director General of the IAEA for
Safeguards, also has stressed the need to adopt what he calls a "statelevel approach" to safeguards. 86 The IAEA traditionally has not
differentiated between states that pose little proliferation threat and
those of great proliferation concern when allocating safeguards
resources.8 7 Thus 60 percent of the IAEA's verification resources were
directed toward only three states, due to the nature and size of their
declared nuclear materials and facilities: the more a state declared,
the more verification resources were allocated to it, regardless of the
actual proliferation risk posed by the state.8 8 While, understandably,
desiring to implement safeguards in a nondiscriminatory manner to
avoid the perception of political favoritism or criticism, the system
was hugely inefficient. 89 Nakaerts has proposed making annual
evaluations of a state's nuclear character, based not only on the
nature and size of known nuclear activities, but also on other
information available to the IAEA, such as satellite imagery,
environmental sampling, and other open-source information."o Based
on the assessment of a state's nuclear character, a tailored
verification program could be implemented: "[O]ne that identifies a
range of safeguards measures necessary to meet State-specific
objectives." 9 '
Without effective measures to verify the peaceful-uses nuclear
technology, nuclear disarmament is likely to remain only a dream. No
current nuclear-weapon state would feel secure disarming, nor would
domestic politics permit disarming, if there were insufficient
confidence that other countries were not secretly working to produce
nuclear weapons or virtual nuclear deterrents.
While the discussion thus far focuses mainly on developing
countries, there is a final concern that must be addressed related to
developed countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. Stability
has been achieved in parts of the world, and arguably several states
have chosen to sacrifice development of nuclear weapons, based on
alliance structures that provided extended nuclear deterrence. The
most illustrative example of this situation is in East Asia. 92

85.
Id.
Nackaerts, supra note 81, at 3-4.
86.
87.
Id. at 2.
88.
See id. (explaining the historical policy of requiring "more verification
scrutiny" for those states with more declared facilities "independent of the real
proliferation risk posed by that State").
89.
Id. at 8-9.
90.
Id. at 4.
91.
Id.
92.
RICHARD C. BUSH, THE U.S. POLICY OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN EAST
ASIA: HISTORY, CURRENT VIEWS, AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2011),
available at
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Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all arguably chose to
forego nuclear weapons because the United States was willing to
threaten their adversaries with nuclear weapons. 9 3 Disarmament
that happens too quickly or without adequate consideration of
existing alliance structures based on extended nuclear deterrence
would expose huge imbalances of conventional forces, such as
between China and Japan. The sudden sense of insecurity that would
follow easily could result in a new regional nuclear-arms race, in
addition to rapid augmentations of conventional forces. Clearly, it is
not only developing countries that must be considered when thinking
about the implications of nuclear disarmament on non-nuclearweapon states; any advocacy for a world without nuclear weapons
must account for these extended deterrence relationships and the
stability they have provided.
C. Verification of Nuclear Disarmament
The difficulties regarding nuclear disarmament that this Note
discusses thus far are the ones that most often are discussed by
security analysts, and for good reason; these problems are likely to be
the most imminent. Unfortunately, as challenging as these problems
are, they may not be the most difficult.
At current levels of nuclear weapons, the verification of nuclear
disarmament hardly seems to matter. Surely, the United States and
Russia will want to ensure for political and confidence-building
reasons that the other lives up to its agreements under the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which would bring the
number of each country's deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550.94 At
these levels, however, strict verification of every single warhead
matters relatively little from a security perspective. On the other
hand, as countries diminish further the number of their nuclear
weapons, verification becomes increasingly important. It is easy to
see, for example, that if the United States and Russia agreed to
possess only five nuclear weapons each, verification of those numbers
would be extraordinarily important. A credible verification regime is
a sine qua non for significant nuclear disarmament, but this point
often is overlooked. Perhaps this is out of fear.
The challenge of verifying nuclear disarmament is incredibly
difficult. Legal, technical, national security, and political issues stand

http://www.brookings.edu/-media/Files/rc/papers/2011/02_arms-control bush/02-arms
control-bush.pdf.
Id.
93.
94.
See Comparison of the START Treaty, Moscow Treaty, and New START
Treaty, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/t/ave/rls/139901.htm
[hereinafter Treaty Comparison] (graphically comparing the START treaty, Moscow
Treaty, and New START treaty).
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in the way of credible disarmament verification. First, the NPT
legally binds nuclear-weapon states to "not in any way . .. assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." 9s
Presumably, any disarmament verification regime would require
experts to access sensitive national nuclear sites and inspect sensitive
nuclear materials and technologies. If inspection teams included
experts from non-nuclear-weapon states, would nuclear-weapon
states be at risk of violating the NPT's provision that they not assist
non-nuclear-weapon states in the acquisition of nuclear weapons? 96
Or does the NPT only prohibit intentional or sought after
assistance?9 7
Assuming this interpretive challenge could be overcome, there
are significant technical and national security challenges that would
have to be resolved. For example, how does one account for weaponsgrade nuclear material from disassembled weapons while protecting
government secrets, such as the precise isotopic ratios and masses of
the material that once comprised the weapon's pit?9 8 Different states
may even have different ideas about what kinds of information are
too secret and sensitive to allow international monitors to inspect
directly.99 Even if workable definitions of "sensitive materials" could
be agreed to among nuclear-weapon states and international
monitors, presumably the same line would not be appropriate for the
public. Thus a further problem is finding a level of transparency that
would allow the public to have faith in the reported findings of
international inspectors.1oo
The fundamental challenge of disarmament verification will be
finding agreement on the level of intrusiveness required to provide
credible assurances of compliance with disarmament obligations. No
verification regime, not even the most intrusive, will be perfect. There
will always be some uncertainty. The question is, how much
uncertainty would states be willing to live with, and would states be
willing to live with the intrusiveness that such a level would
require? 10 ' To complicate matters further, different states may have

95.
NPT, supra note 6, art. I.
96.
Andreas Persbo & Marius Bjorningstad, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament:
The Inspector's Agenda, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N (May 2008), http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2008 05/PersboShea.
97.
Id.
98.
Christopher A. Ford, Why Not Nuclear Disarmament?,27 NEw ATLANTIs 3,
7 (2010).

99.

Id. at 7.

100.
Id.
101.
See id. at 4, 19 (providing an overview of potential questions surrounding
disarmament verification).
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different tolerances for uncertainty. 102 Generally, however, states are
likely to demand more and more certainty as the number of nuclear
weapons shrinks to zero. 103 The presence of even a single nuclear
weapon under a regime of complete nuclear disarmament would have
extraordinary military significance. 104
Given these challenges, it is hard to imagine that acceptable
levels of both intrusiveness and uncertainty could be agreed to among
the nuclear-weapon states, let alone the public. This does not mean
that nuclear disarmament should be abandoned as a goal, but it
might mean that different end games should be considered, such as a
disarmament agreement that allows each nuclear-weapon state to
retain one weapon or only a few weapons, or an agreement that gives
some measure of control over a remaining few nuclear weapons to an
international organization. 0 5 These non-zero alternatives to complete
disarmament may be easier, but they too would face many of the
challenges described above. In any event, the behavioral economic
and negotiating tools subsequently described will help the
disarmament advocate make the best case for a world without
nuclear weapons.
Table 2
Summary of Significant
Concerns Related to
Nuclear-Weapon States
Conventional force
imbalances between
China, Russia and
the United States
Nuclear capabilities
of states outside the
NPT and associated
regional conflicts

Impediments to Complete Nuclear Disarmament
Concerns Related to NonDisarmament Verification
Nuclear-Weapon States
Developing
Inspections that
prevent proliferation
"proliferation-safe"
civil nuclear
and protect state
secretes
technology
Living with
Enforcing NPT
uncertainty
nonproliferation
provisions
*
Effects on extended
deterrence, especially
for allies of the
United States

IV. How BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS COULD INFORM A NEW
DISARMAMENT ADVOCACY

Advocates for nuclear disarmament have been quite successful
during the past decades in making the moral argument for the

102.
Id. at 4.
103.
Id. at 4-5.
104.
Id. at 5.
105.
See Avis Bohlen, Arms Control in the Cold War, 14 FOOTNOTES (2009),
availableat http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1407.200905.bohlen.armscontrolcoldwar.html.
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abolition of nuclear weapons.106 But moral pressure alone is unlikely
to be sufficient to convince states to disarm. Under a classic economic
model, states would have to be convinced that the utility of
disarmament, perhaps taking account of the "warm glow" from acting
in the public good, is greater than the utility of retaining nuclear
weapons.1 0 7 The proper way to calculate these utilities, of course,
would be a subject of much debate, and may vary by country, but
calculating utility is not the purpose of this Note. Here, every benefit
of the doubt is given to the disarmament advocate, so that it is
assumed that disarmament is not only the morally correct thing to
do, but also the classically, economically rational thing to do. If this is
not the case, disarmament advocates have more serious challenges
than those discussed above. The questions then are (1) assuming
disarmament is the economically rational decision, why have states
not yet disarmed, and (2) what could be done to help them disarm?
Classical economics teaches that people have stable and coherent
preferences, and given a set of options and probabilistic beliefs, they
will make decisions that maximize the expected value of utility.os
Generally stated, human behavior is determined by utility
maximization based on stable preferences and ideal information.1o9
Psychology and other social sciences, however, have shown that realworld behavior deviates significantly and consistently from how this
ideal rational person makes decisions. 110 Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky have written extensively about how people are loss
averse and heavily influenced by arbitrary reference points; risk
averse in losses and risk seeking in gains; and subject to diminishing
sensitivity to possibilities farther away from a reference point.1"1
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler argue that people
have bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded selfinterest.112 A few of these deviations from classical economic decision

106.
See, e.g., Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Comm., supra note 2 (explaining
that "[diemocracy and human rights are to be strengthened" as the world progresses
toward nuclear disarmament).
107.
See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the
Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315, 338 (2009) (describing how a "warm glow" effect
can influence economic decision making).
108.
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. EcON. LITERATURE 11, 11
(1998).
109.
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (recalling Gary
Becker's basic definition of "standard economic principles").
See id. at 1476-77 (explaining the concept of bounded rationality).
110.
111.
See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (providing an
alternative to the utility theory in recognition of the fact that there are "several classes
of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected
utility theory").
112.
Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109, at 1477-79.
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making will be explored before describing what they might teach us
about how to better advocate for nuclear disarmament.

A. Tools from BehavioralEconomics
Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory has become quite
influential in the field of behavioral economics. 13 One of the most
distinctive characteristics of Prospect Theory is that, in evaluating
risks, reference points heavily influence people's outcomes. 114 People
are more sensitive to deviations from a reference point than they are
to absolute values. For example, the same cup of water can feel either
cold or hot, depending on whether one has just come inside from the
frigid cold or a sweltering summer day.115 Moreover, even arbitrary
anchor points have a significant impact on decision making.1 16 For
example, in one experiment, two sets of federal judges were asked to
estimate damages in a tragic tort case: one set of judges simply was
given the facts of the case, while the other set was also told that the
defendant had filed a motion to dismiss for failure to meet the
$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement." 7 The set of judges that
was told of the amount-in-controversy issue denied the motion to
dismiss, but awarded on average $882,000 in damages. On the other
hand, the set of judges who only heard the facts of the case awarded,
on average, $1,249,000.118 The difference between the two awards
was roughly 30 percent. 119 Though the amount-in-controversy
requirement should have nothing to do with a rational calculation of
a damages award-indeed it was an arbitrary reference point-it
clearly played a significant role in the average award.120
A corollary to this reference dependence is that people routinely
are more averse to losses than they are attracted to the same-size
gain, in a ratio of about two-to-one.121 Colloquially speaking, a modest
loss feels twice as bad as the same-sized gain feels good. Prospect
Theory also predicts that people are risk seeking in losses and risk
averse in gains.122 For example, when faced with a certain loss, one

113.
See, e.g., id. at 1477-78 (highlighting and building upon Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky's model).
114.
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 111, at 274.
115.
Rabin, supranote 108, at 13.
See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
116.
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 790-93 (2001) (revealing the results of a
judicially based anchoring study).
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 791-92 (discussing how the amount-in-controversy requirement
affected the damage awards).
121.
Rabin, supranote 108, at 13-14.
122.
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 111, at 286-87.
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may be willing to take a large risk of an even greater loss for the
chance of breaking even, but when faced with a certain gain, even
good odds on a significantly larger gain will be rebuffed. 123 If the odds
or the wager differential is significantly changed, these tendencies, of
course, can be overcome.
As Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler note, rationality is not the only
human faculty that is bounded; willpower is bounded as well. 124 Most
people will be sympathetic to the scenario of deferring a trip to the
gym and promising one's self to go instead "tomorrow," only to find
one's self repeating the promise when "tomorrow" rolls around.125
Economists refer to this as time discounting: people tend to discount
the utility of future gains and losses.126 Some people know they do
this, can correctly predict it, and can account for such discounting
under classical economic models, but others do not correctly predict
how they discount the future. 127 For these people, commitment
devices, such as paying a large amount for a monthly gym
membership, with rebates for each visit, are particularly helpful in
keeping promises.1 28
Finally, whether economically rational or not, people care about
the fairness of behavior, especially in negotiations.129 In this fairness
context, assuming that a bargaining zone actually exists, there is only
one "fair" point or perhaps a small range within that zone at which a
deal can be reached. 130 This ignores the fact that, by definition, any
deal within the bargaining zone will be economically rational to both
parties; there is no rational justification for parties to seek such a
particular "fair" deal point. 131 Nonetheless, parties almost always
agree that a particular deal point within the bargaining zone is
somehow "fair."132 Fairness, however, is an elusive concept.13 3

123.
See id. (discussing Prospect Theory and risk preferences for losses).
124.
Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109, at 1479.
See id. ("[Bounded willpower] refers to the fact that human beings often
125.
take actions that they know will conflict with their long-term interests.").
See id. at 1539 (asserting that "impatience is very strong for near rewards
126.
(and aversion very strong for near punishments) but that each of these declines over
time-a pattern referred to as 'hyperbolic discounting').
127.
Id. at 1479, 1539 (discussing smokers who recognize that they cannot stop
smoking because of time-discounting problems and thus "pay money to join a program
or obtain a drug that will help them quit," while criminals fail to recognize their timediscounting problems and thus often commit crimes).
128.
See id. at 1479 (discussing other commitment devices such as pension plans
to prevent undersaving).
129.
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 184 (2d ed.
2009).
130.
Id. at 184, 211-20.
131.
Id. at 183-84.
132.
Id..
133.
Id. at 184.

2013/

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ADVOCACY

993

Sometimes fairness is thought of merely as similar to what has
been done before; for example, if all previous contracts between two
parties have included a "hold harmless" provision, it might seem
unfair if a party unilaterally demanded the removal of such a clause
during a contract negotiation, even if that provision were worth very
little to both sides.134 Oftentimes in the negotiation context, fairness
is thought of as a procedural norm: if the procedure to reach a deal
was considered fair, the deal itself must be fair.' 3 5 Other times, if
resources must be divided, the division often will be judged fair if the
division was based on the principle of equity, equality, or need. 136
The disarmament advocate can harness these few insights from
behavioral economics to better make a case for nuclear zero.
B. Applying Theory to Nuclear DisarmamentAdvocacy
One of the main findings of behavioral economics is that, in the
real world, peoples' decisions are strongly influenced by the reference
point from which decisions are measured. 3 7 Furthermore, people are
loss averse; once one possesses something, it is more difficult than
traditional economics suggests it rationally should be to give that
thing up.' 38 The application of this finding to nuclear disarmament
advocacy should be clear: nuclear-weapon states possess nuclear
weapons, and it will be more difficult to give them up than traditional
economics suggests it rationally should be.' 3 9 This may seem to be
anything but helpful to disarmament advocates, but beyond merely
describing the resistance many advocates sometimes encounter from
nuclear-weapon states, it suggests ways that advocacy might be
reshaped to better account for this reference dependence and loss
aversion.
First, disarmament advocates should reconsider how they frame
their goals. 140 A treaty on complete nuclear disarmament within
narrow timetables may be the desired goal,141 but if it is presented as
the next step and the only way forward, the effort seems doomed to
fail. Such a proposition is a bit like telling a drinker of five venti
Starbucks coffees per day that he must discontinue all caffeine
consumption tomorrow: a position that is perhaps physically possible,

134.
See id. at 183-84 (indicating that participants of a negotiation may reject
offers they view as unfair, "even when doing so is costly to them").
135.
See id. ("[Cloncluding an agreement often requires negotiators ... to
believe that . . . the division of the cooperative surplus is a fair one.").
136.
Id. at 211-23.
137.
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 111, at 274.
138.
Rabin, supranote 108, at 13-14.
See id. (discussing theories regarding loss aversion).
139.
140.
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 111, at 274 (asserting that reference
points and expectations "can be affected by the formulation of the offered prospects").
141.
See NGO Statements, supra note 30.
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but one that is highly unlikely to be adopted. Instead, disarmament
advocates should consider endorsing a specific, serial approach to
complete disarmament in order to minimize the effects of loss
aversion.
The advocate conscious of reference dependence, framing effects,
and loss aversion14 2 would become expert in analyzing just how much
"loss" nuclear-weapon states could tolerate at each step toward
disarmament, taking account of current threat perceptions, military
planning, and alliance structures. Advocates could argue that
progress should be refrained, not in terms of progress toward total
disarmament, or even in terms of further reductions from the most
recent arms-control treaty, 143 but rather with respect to then-existing
perceptions of need based on the security environment and military
infrastructures. The advocate would challenge those perceptions and
urge realistic steps toward the end of the spectrum of the possible,
informed by an understanding of loss tolerance. Initially, such an
approach could be to argue for just how many weapons Russia and
China would actually need to feel secure against the United States'
superior conventional capabilities, and how many weapons the
United States would need to assure its allies that its threat of
extended deterrence remained credible.
After each iterative reduction, a period of transformation would
have to take place: either tensions would have to be further reduced,
or alternative deterrence capabilities would have to be developed to
make possible another step in the iterative reduction process.
Doubtless, disarmament advocates would promote an easing of
tensions, but if their ultimate goal is nuclear disarmament, they also
should be open to the possibility of some less objectionable deterrence
structure to take the place of nuclear weapons. Without such periods
of transformation, Russia and China presumably would not feel
secure enough to disarm further, and U.S. allies presumably would
not feel secure enough to condone further reductions from the United
States.
This new framing of the disarmament process would seem to put
advocates in the strange position of legitimizing nuclear weapons, at
least in the short term, but there is no reason that advocates could
not continue to make their moral arguments for a world without
nuclear weapons. An iterative refraining approach, however, could
minimize loss aversion and bring about significant, though not total,
disarmament in the near term. It also would build the credibility of

142.
Rabin, supra note 108, at 13-14 (discussing reference dependence, framing
effects, and loss aversion).
143.
Treaty Comparison, supra note 94 (showing reductions in warheads and
delivery vehicles).
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the NGA community, making suggestions for further iterative steps
more forceful.
The approach to a disarmament process for issue-specific
possessors has always been more complicated, given that these states
are involved in ongoing and severe regional disputes, and that NPT
states do not want to be seen as legitimizing weapons outside of
international norms. 144 As a result, NPT states have been reluctant
to address head-on the disarmament of non-NPT states within the
formal treaty review process.145 Though this is a difficult problem for
NPT states, it presents an opportunity for the NGA community. As
nonpolitical, independent actors, disarmament advocates could
provide the primary source of motivation for disarmament outside of
the NPT process.
Just because issue-specific possessors are outside the NPT does
not mean they are any less susceptible to loss aversion. 146 Like with
regular NPT nuclear-weapon states, disarmament advocates could
promote an iterative approach to disarmament with intervening
transformation periods for issue-specific possessors. This, of course,
would require advocates to understand the regional conflicts that
spurred the development of nuclear weapons in the first place. Some
surely would reject any perceived link between regional conflicts and
nuclear disarmament, probably out of concern of the intractability of
the conflict, and thus the unlikelihood of any progress toward
disarmament.147 However, the iterative approach this Note suggests
does not necessarily require easing of tensions between disarmament
steps; the development of an alternative deterrence structure also
may allow for further steps toward nuclear disarmament. Thus an
iterative approach to disarmament for issue-specific possessors
engaged in ongoing conflicts does not necessarily require the
resolution of the conflicts as a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament.
Behavioral economics also can inform advocates about how to
handle security concerns related to non-nuclear-weapon states in a
way that would not threaten total nuclear disarmament and would
ensure continued access to nuclear technology for civil purposes.
Supporting a robust IAEA safeguards system to verify declared
nuclear activities and monitor potential undeclared activities should
not be controversial,148 but what happens when a state violates those

144.
Jenny Nielsen, Engaging India, Israel and Pakistan in the Nuclear NonProliferation Regime, ACRONYM INST. DISARMAMENT DIPL. (Dec. 15, 2007),
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd86/86jn.htm.
145.
Id.
146.
Rabin, supra note 108, at 13-14 (discussing people's general sensitivity to
loss and loss aversion).
147.
Greenpeace, Conditions for a Nuclear Free Middle East, MIDDLE POWERS
INST. (February 2007), http://www.middlepowers.org/docs/A6F ViennaDatan.pdf.
148.
See ElBaradei, supra note 69 (pointing out considerable advantages of
nonproliferation measures).
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safeguard agreements often is very controversial.149 If there ever is to
be sufficient confidence to support developing country access to civil
nuclear technology, or a credible system of nuclear disarmament
verification, the world must expect that violations of verification
regimes will be punished. 50
Unfortunately, too often states mispredict how they will respond
to future violations of safeguards agreements.15 This is what Jolls,
Sunstein, and Thaler refer to as bounded willpower, or time
discounting.152 For example, a state may be reluctant to support UN
Security Council resolutions against a potential violator of the NPT
before the IAEA raises questions of weapons development, but then
once such a finding is made, the state nonetheless allows other
political considerations to trump a policy in support of sanctions.15 3
Disarmament advocates could help reframe this issue to be one
necessary for disarmament: it would only be damaging to the civil use
of nuclear technology and to a future disarmament verification
regime to set the precedent of safeguards violations that go
unpunished.
To help states cope with the problem of bounded willpower,
disarmament advocates could propose commitment devices; for
example, that the Security Council adopt ex ante mandatory,
minimum consequences for safeguards violations as determined by
the IAEA. First-time offenders could face relatively minimal
mandatory consequences, but successive or continuing violators could
be subjected to an increasingly onerous scale of minimum
punishments.
Such mandatory international condemnation of illicit behavior
would serve two purposes. First, it would build trust among nations
to facilitate the continued use of nuclear technology for civil purpose
around the world, especially in developing countries. Without
confidence in the international system to respond to NPT violations,
sophisticated nuclear countries almost certainly would become wary
of facilitating the development of nuclear technologies around the

149.
See, e.g., Steve Gutterman, Russia Opposes New Iran Sanctions over IAEA
Report, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2011, 1:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/09/
us-nuclear-iran-russia-idUSTRE7A857620111109 (explaining Russia's reluctance to
support a new UN Security Council resolution against Iran despite a damning new
IAEA report).
Amano, supra note 83, at 2 (noting that the IAEA has a role to play in
150.
verifying nuclear disarmament).
151.
Gutterinan, supra note 149 (recounting Russia's assertion that a step-bystep process should be employed for responding to Iran's misconduct "under which
existing sanctions would be eased in return for actions by Tehran to dispel
international concerns").
152.
Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109, at 1479.
153.
See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 149 (recounting Russian comments that
any new sanctions "will be seen in the international community as an instrument for
regime change in Tehran").
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world.15 4 Second, a mandatory punishment system could serve as a
test model for an eventual nuclear disarmament regime, which nonnuclear-weapon states surely would have a strong interest in making
credible.' 5 5 In the world of complete nuclear disarmament, states
must have the confidence that any hint of a violation of a nuclearweapons convention would be quickly and appropriately addressed,
and if need be, punished. 5 6
Disarmament advocates also could help promote the use of
multilateral nuclear supply-and-waste mechanisms to limit the
potential of a future virtual weapons race, and increase the chance
that a world without nuclear weapons would be sufficiently stable.' 5 7
Here, however, one must be mindful of the fact that people tend to be
risk seeking in losses and risk averse in gains.' 5 8 Advocates should be
careful of zero-sum analysis in which non-nuclear-weapon states feel
like current momentum for nuclear disarmament is a gain for them,
and a loss for the nuclear-weapon states. Such thinking could make
non-nuclear-weapon states risk averse to novel kinds of nuclear
supply-and-waste mechanisms.
Part of the work of the expert advocate would be to frame the
issue as a win-win scenario rather than a zero-sum calculation;
indeed, some advocates already have made this point. 159 An
additional approach, however, would be to increase the odds of a
perceived "risky" bet or decrease the expectation of a sure gain.160
The perceived risk of relying on multilateral fuel supply-and-waste
mechanisms could be reduced in many ways, including: creating
regional fuel banks, with regional officials serving as directors;
encouraging developed states to provide subsidies for power grids or
nuclear facilities in countries that agree to rely on multilateral fuel
banks;
or
developing
international
agreements
against
anticompetitive or politically motivated nuclear trade involving fuel

154.
See HAROLD FEIVESON ET AL., CTR. FOR INT'L & SEC. STUDIES AT MD., CAN
NUCLEAR POWER BE MADE PROLIFERATION RESISTANT? 15 (2008), available at

http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/futurenuclear-power.pdf (noting that in a
world of significant nuclear disarmament, any attempt by a country to acquire nuclear
weapons would have to be confronted by strong measures to ensure compliance with
international obligations).
155.
See generally Persbo, supra note 96 (noting the importance of credibility in
a disarmament verification regime).
156.
See id.
157.
Goldschmidt, supra note 68, at 7.
158.
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 111, at 286-87 (discussing Prospect
Theory).
159.
Jasjit Singh, Manpreet Sethi & Garry Jacobs, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,
INT'L CENTER PEACE & DEV. (2007), http://www.icpd.org/defensestudies/Elimination%/
20ofo2Onuclear%20weapons.htm.
160.
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 111, at 286-87 (discussing Prospect
Theory).
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banks. 161 Alternatively, the perceived expectation of a sure gain could
be diminished by stating that the advocate's credibility regarding
disarmament depends on being a strong voice for safeguards
enforcement and promoting proliferation-safe and disarmamentencouraging civil uses of nuclear energy. Without a demonstrated
commitment to nonproliferation, the sure gain of momentum toward
disarmament will diminish.
Finally, the work of the disarmament advocate, indeed of the
entire enterprise of nuclear disarmament, must be viewed as fair if it
is to succeed. But as was noted above, "fair" can be an elusive
concept.162 For many years, non-nuclear-weapon states have argued
that the review and enforcement of the NPT has been skewed against
them, requiring ever more stringent and intrusive nonproliferation
measures, while failing to require significant steps toward
disarmament. 163 Also, for many years, nuclear-weapon states,
especially France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have
argued that the world seems unwilling to do what is necessary to
actually curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons.1 64 Criticisms here
include both failure to enforce nonproliferation obligations and
punish violators of the NPT, and a perception that non-nuclearweapon states view their right to nuclear technology as unfettered,
regardless of proliferation risk. Last but not least, many states view it
as unfair that non-NPT states are able to escape significant
inspection and pressure to adhere to international nonproliferation
and disarmament norms.16 5 Clearly, the perception of unfairness is
prevalent today. Changing this perception may be the most important
work of the new disarmament advocate.
First, the disarmament advocate must establish his or her own
credibility. Moral credibility is not the issue; rather, the disarmament
advocate must focus on becoming evermore technically and politically
credible. To be technically credible, an advocate must demonstrate a
sufficient understanding of both the international laws and norms
that govern nonproliferation and disarmament, and the technological
intricacies of nuclear materials and processes. Of course not every
advocate must be a nuclear engineer, but he or she should know

161.
See Perkovich, supra note 34, at 90-95 (discussing the possibility of
multinational or international fuel-cycle facilities and the implications of such
ownership).
162.
KOROBKIN, supra note 129, at 184.
163.
Harold Miller, Exec. Dir. & Head of the Research Dep't, Peace Research
Inst. Frankfurt, & George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies & Dir. of the Nuclear
Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Speech: Debating Disarmament: Bridging the Gap in the Nuclear
Order (Feb. 14, 2012), transcript available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
021412_transscript~disarmament.pdf.
164.
Id.
165.
Nielsen, supra note 144.
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enough about nuclear materials to know what are and are not
technically credible possibilities for nuclear disarmament and
power.16 6 The advocate also must be politically credible, and in two
ways: he or she should not overtly take sides between the parties, and
he or she should sufficiently demonstrate an understanding of the
political and security dynamics countries consider when evaluating
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation issues. If the disarmament
advocate is not technically and politically credible, their participation
in the process will largely be irrelevant.
Taking for granted the advocate's credibility, how can the
advocate harness the social norm of fairness to facilitate nuclear
disarmament? Unlike a typical negotiation context, the disarmament
advocate probably views the bargaining zone as consisting of a single
point: zero nuclear weapons. 167 In this situation, there is no
cooperative surplus to divide between the parties, thus the typical
norms of distributive justice (equity, equality, and need) seem
insufficient in the disarmament context. 168 Similarly, because the
problems associated with nuclear weapons are so unique and
technologically complex, looking to past examples of arms-control
agreements, such as the Land Mine Convention,1 69 are unlikely to be
a good guide for the nuclear-disarmament process. Thus, fairness as
convention is unlikely to be a good model. 170 What remains is fairness
embodied in procedural norms, and here the disarmament advocate
can play a significant role.
There is a strong social norm that demands reciprocity in
negotiation. 1 7' When one party gives something of value, there is a
strong expectation that the other party will reciprocate with
something of value. 172 In the iterative disarmament process, this
suggests that significant disarmament and nonproliferation steps
should proceed more or less in tandem. A major disarmament

166.
One disarmament advocate proposed simply dipping nuclear weapons into
molasses. Though I suspect such a proposal is largely in jest, the implied suggestion
that disarmament is easy, and is merely a matter of will, undermines the technical
credibility of the advocate community. See, e.g., Tova Fuller, The 2010 NPT Review
Conference: May 5th, IPPNW PEACE & HEALTH BLOG (May 5, 2010),
http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2010/05/05/the-2010-npt-review-conference-may-5th/
(recounting the proposal that disarmament could be achieved by dipping nuclear
weapons in molasses).
167.
KOROBKIN, supra note 129, at 157 (discussing various types of negotiators
and their bargaining zones).
168.
Id. (discussing the difficulties negotiators have assessing the bargaining
zone).
169.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 211.
170.
KOROBKIN, supra note 129, at 211 (discussing fairness norms).
171.
Id. at 184.
172.
Id.
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landmark should warrant a significant development on the
nonproliferation front, and vice versa. For example, the most recent
disarmament treaty between the United States and Russia, New
START, 173 could warrant an agreement on mandatory Security
Council action in response to belligerent withdrawal from the NPT.
The first major agreement among all five NPT nuclear-weapon states
could warrant mandatory participation in a multilateral nuclear fuelsupply mechanism. Right now, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclearweapon states both view the other as one-sided in the disarmament
nonproliferation debate. 174
. Disarmament advocates could play an important role in
establishing the reciprocity norm at the international level. The
practical opposite of reciprocity, Boulwarism, in which one party
proposes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer, almost always is perceived
as an act of bad faith. 7 5 Unfortunately, this appears dangerously
close to what nuclear disarmament advocates currently are proposing
with a nuclear-weapons convention.1 76 A nuclear-weapons convention
can be the goal, but an iterative approach to disarmament, based on
reciprocity, will almost surely be better received by the necessary
parties. 7 7
Finally, it should be noted that the reciprocity norm should not
be viewed as prohibiting one-sided disarmament or nonproliferation
action when it is warranted. For example, if the United States decides
that it no longer needs several hundred nuclear weapons to meet its
security requirements, it should not necessarily wait to dismantle
them until the international community is ready to adopt significant
new nonproliferation obligations. Similarly, if a hole in the
nonproliferation regime is exposed by some crisis, the world should
not wait until significant disarmament steps are taken before fixing
that hole. Reciprocity should be a norm in the formal disarmament
process; it should not prevent "one-sided" action when such action is
necessary.

V. CONCLUSION

Advocates of nuclear disarmament have been influential in
convincing world leaders to take nuclear disarmament seriously. As

173.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY Doc. No. 111-5 (2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-11ltdoc5/pdflCDOC-11ltdoc5.pdf.
174.
Mueller, supra note 163.
175.
KOROBKIN, supra note 129, at 194.
176.
Burroughs et al., supra note 29.
177.
KOROBKIN, supranote 129, at 194-95 (discussing the reciprocity norm).
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work turns toward the practical challenges of ridding the world of
such weapons, however, advocates risk their continued relevance if
they do not adapt to focus on helping states overcome the significant
technological and political impediments that stand in the way of
nuclear disarmament.
Based on lessons from behavioral economics and negotiating
theory, this Note proposes that advocates embrace an iterative
approach to disarmament to combat loss aversion and discourage
framing effects. A significant new role for the advocate could be to
help assess just how much loss nuclear-weapon states could tolerate
at each step in the disarmament process, taking account of current
threat perceptions, military planning, and alliance structures.
Between such steps, advocates could either work to encourage the
reduction of insecurities or the development of alternative deterrence
structures that would allow for successive nuclear disarmament
steps.
advocates
could
non-nuclear-weapon
states,
Regarding
encourage commitment devices to enforce nonproliferation norms and
reframe risk perceptions of nuclear supply arrangements; after all,
nuclear disarmament will remain an elusive goal if nonproliferation
is not taken seriously. Because people often discount future events,
commitment devices, such as ex ante agreement on Security Council
action for violations of nonproliferation norms, could be encouraged to
provide more reliable enforcement of the nonproliferation regime.
Additionally, to combat risk aversion related to alternative nuclear
fuel-supply mechanisms, disarmament advocates should work to
decrease the perceived benefit of the status quo or increase the odds
of achieving an agreeable alternative.
Finally, because of the strong norm of fairness in negotiations,
advocates should first work to establish their technological and
political credibility to serve as third-party participants, and second,
should focus their efforts on the procedural fairness of the formal
disarmament process. Traditional norms of distributive justice are
less persuasive in the disarmament context, because there is no
cooperative surplus to divide; for the advocate, the bargaining zone
consists of a single point: zero nuclear weapons. Likewise, fairness
based on convention or other arms-control efforts is likely to be
insufficient in the nuclear-disarmament context, because the
problems associated with nuclear weapons are so unique and
technologically complex.
NGAs have provided a strong moral voice for the total
disarmament of nuclear weapons, but if they are to remain credible
participants in the disarmament process, they must redouble their
efforts to assist in the difficult technical and political obstacles that
stand in the way of a world without nuclear weapons. They must
account for how states actually behave, not just how they would like
them to behave. In this respect, behavioral economics can provide
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clues to the construction of a modern, more effective nucleardisarmament advocacy.
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